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Abstract 
Numerous scientific studies show that risk factors can interact to synergistically increase the 
likelihood of certain adverse and life-threatening outcomes. Yet, the extent to which individuals 
know that specific risk factor combinations present ‘synergistic risks’ is unclear and little is 
known about the determinants of such knowledge. This is largely because epistemological 
progress concerning this topic has been frustrated by a reliance on metrics that have latterly been 
judged to be of questionable validity. To address this issue, this paper presents two studies that 
assess an alternative approach (i.e. risk model judgements) which requires respondents to judge 
the risk for a factor combination relative to, rather than in isolation from, the risk attributable to 
each constituent factor. Results from both studies indicate that risk model judgements overcome 
the drawbacks of the traditional metrics. More importantly, the results provide epistemological 
insights into what can determine whether an individual understands that a factor combination 
presents a synergistic risk; these determinants include experiential and intuitive insights into the 
effects of combining specific risk factors, domain-specific judgemental experience and exposure 
to effective learning opportunities. These findings can be utilised in interventions aimed at 
helping individuals to make better decisions concerning multiple risk factors. 
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Adverse outcomes are rarely attributable to just one factor. For example, whilst some incidence 
of adverse cardiovascular events might be attributed to a single factor, such as obesity, it is more 
often the case that cardiovascular events result from a combination of two or more factors, such 
as smoking, poor diet, genetic predisposition, heavy alcohol consumption, sedentary lifestyle, 
and so on (Yusuf, Giles, Croft, Anda, & Casper, 1998). Similarly, whilst one could attribute 
climate change to the CO2 emissions produced by human activity, the causal circumstances are 
far more complex. Specifically, factors, such as global population growth, affluence, technology, 
and consumption behaviours, all interact to determine the level of CO2 emissions produced by 
humans (Huppert & Sparks, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2009; York, Rosa, & Dietz, 2003). Awareness 
of vulnerability to certain risk factors can play a major role in influencing the adoption of 
precautionary behaviours (Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley, 2005; Eiser & Arnold, 1999; Floyd, 
Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000) and it is, therefore, vital that individuals have the ability to 
understand the range of factors that might increase the risk of specific adverse events and, more 
importantly, how the interaction of these factors may increase the risk further. 
 The value of understanding the risk attributable to multiple factors is further accentuated 
by the accumulation of scientific evidence showing that certain factor combinations interact to 
present a risk that is greater than the sum of the risk attributable to each constituent factor. Such 
‘synergistic risks’ have been reported across a range of psychological, sociological, ecological 
and epidemiological studies. For example, research has identified a synergistic risk of developing 
lung cancer for individuals who are regularly exposed to both radon (a naturally occurring 
radioactive gas) and tobacco smoke (Barros-Dios, Barreiro, Ruano-Ravina, & Figueiras, 2002; 
Darby et al., 2005; Pershagen et al., 1994). Furthermore, evidence indicates that the interaction 
of habitat destruction and climate change present synergistic risks of food shortages and the 
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extinction of various animal and plant species (Brook, Sodhi, & Bradshaw, 2008; Lin, Perfecto, 
& Vandermeer, 2008; Travis, 2003). The need to learn more about the extent to which 
individuals understand this important risk issue is highlighted by the sustained identification of 
factor combinations that present synergistic risks (e.g., Ben et al., 2011; Boltz, Hollenbeak, 
Ortenzi, & Dillon, 2012; Brook, Sodhi, & Bradshaw, 2008). 
 A clear concern is that if individuals underestimate the threat posed by synergistic risks 
they will not be motivated to adopt appropriate precautionary behaviours or to demand/support 
political, social, and economic action to address these issues (Dawson, Johnson, & Luke, 2012a, 
2012c; French, Sutton, Kinmonth, & Marteau, 2006). Similarly, where policy-makers and 
regulators do not recognise that certain combined factors present synergistic risks, there is a 
concern that they may fail to implement policies and strategies that are proportionate to the risks 
(Berenbaum, 1989; Cogliano, 1997). The legitimacy of these concerns is confirmed by studies 
that have investigated individuals’ risk estimates for combined factors that present synergistic 
health risks. Specifically, a majority of these studies found that individuals’ estimates were 
consistent with either additive (i.e. equal to the sum of the constituent risks) or sub-additive (i.e. 
less than the sum of the constituent risks) models of risk (for a comprehensive taxonomy, see 
French et al., 2006). However, the authors of several studies exploring subjective judgements of 
synergistic risks have questioned the validity of the previous findings, arguing that the 
participants’ risk magnitude judgements may have been artefacts of the linear rating scales 
employed (French, Gayton, Burton, Thorogood, & Marteau, 2002; French, Marteau, Sutton, & 
Kinmouth, 2004; French et al., 2006; Hampson, Andrews, Lee, Lichtenstein, & Barckley, 2000). 
For example, when participants have been required to use a Likert-type scale to provide separate 
risk magnitude estimates for constituent risk factors, it was observed that estimates were often at 
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the high end of the scale (e.g., a rating of ‘6’ on a 7-point scale), which left no room on the scale 
to represent a synergistic effect for the factors when combined. Furthermore, French et al. (2006) 
found that risk estimates for the same combination of risk factors varied according to whether 
participants used a nine-point, 101-point, or unbounded response scale. Moreover, French et al.’s 
findings also indicated that the sensitivity of the three scales may not be sufficient to detect 
different risk models (i.e. sub-additive, additive, or synergistic) for different factor combinations 
(see French et al. [2004, 2006] for a thorough analysis and review of the validity of the metrics 
employed in previous studies). Consequently, few firm conclusions can be made from the studies 
that employed linear rating scales with regards to the extent that subjective judgements of 
synergistic risks are consistent with scientific risk assessments. 
 
Using risk model judgements to assess judgements of synergistic risks 
More recently, researchers have employed alternative methods, such as examining ‘possibility 
judgements’ and ‘articulated reasoning’ to assess individual’s judgements and understanding of 
synergistic risks (see Dawson, Johnson, & Luke, 2012a, 2012c). One innovative approach, 
introduced by Condit and Shen (2011) in a study concerning public understanding of gene-
environment interactions, required participants to provide risk model judgements rather than risk 
magnitude estimates. That is, instead of asking participants to provide single-point risk estimates 
on a linear continuum or scale, participants were asked to judge whether the risk attributable to 
the combination of (risky) health behaviours and a genetic predisposition to heart disease was 
either less than (i.e., sub-additive), equal to (i.e., additive) or more than (i.e. synergistic) the sum 
of the risk attributable to each factor alone. Condit and Shen reported that a majority of their 
participants judged that the combination presented an additive risk and that only one-third of the 
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participants judged, in line with scientific risk assessments, that the combination presented a 
synergistic risk. As discussed below, while these findings are mostly of specific value to those 
interested in lay understanding of harmful interactions between genes and lifestyle behaviours, 
the use of risk model judgements in research concerning individuals’ understanding of 
synergistic risks has several potential advantages over the linear scales previously employed. 
 To improve the calibration of subjective judgements involving multiple probability 
estimates (i.e. risk judgements), an approach known as decomposition-recomposition can be 
employed (Goodwin & Wright, 2010, Hora, Dodd, & Hora, 1993). In this procedure, a 
judgement task involving multiple subjective probability estimates is broken-up (decomposed) 
into individual judgements and then recombined mechanistically (recomposed). The underlying 
assumption of this approach is that task complexity is reduced and, thus, the calibration of 
judges’ estimates can be improved. However, the research evidence in this regard is mixed. 
Decomposition-recomposition has been shown to enhance the accuracy of probability 
judgements in some circumstances (Edwards, Phillips, Hays, & Goodman, 1968; Wright, Rowe, 
Bolger, & Gammack, 1994) but Wright, Saunders and Ayton (1988) found that this is not always 
the case. It has been proposed that the decomposition-recomposition approach may fail to 
improve probability judgements when the task is framed in a manner that is inappropriate to the 
judgement task or when it renders the task unfamiliar to the judge (Goodwin & Wright, 2010; 
Wright et al., 2009). 
Previous studies investigating peoples’ risk judgements for combined factors have 
obtained risk estimates from participants in a decomposed form. That is, participants have made 
separate (decomposed) risk estimates for each constituent factor and for the combined factors. 
The researchers then compared (mechanistically recomposed) the three risk estimates to 
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determine whether the individual’s risk estimate for the combined factors is less than (sub-
additive), equal to (additive) or more than (synergistic) the sum of the participant’s risk estimates 
for each constituent factor. Whilst this approach may reduce task complexity, it may also fail to 
make the ultimate purpose of the judgement task explicitly clear to the participants, i.e., the need 
to make a risk judgement for the combined factors relative to the risk attributable to each 
constituent. Consequently, it is not explicitly clear to the respondent that he/she should articulate 
whether he/she believes that the combined factors presents a risk that is less than, equal to, or 
more than the sum of the risk presented by each constituent factor. Hence, even if a respondent is 
aware (consciously or intuitively) that a combination presents a synergistic risk, it cannot be 
assumed that he/she will appreciate that this should be reflected in the risk estimates that he/she 
provides. By contrast, the approach of asking participants to provide risk model judgements, as 
employed by Condit & Shen (2011), overcomes this issue because participants are explicitly 
instructed to consider whether the risk for the combined factors is less than, equal to or more 
than the sum of the risk for each constituent factor. 
Research shows that when it is not made explicitly clear to participants exactly what 
beliefs/judgements they should represent in their responses to a risk judgement task, participants 
often respond in a way that is not intended by the researcher (for a review see Windschitl, 2002). 
For example, Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin (1999) found, across multiple datasets, that there 
was a disproportionately high number of respondents who selected 50% on a probability scale, 
which Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin identified as respondents using the 50% option to represent 
uncertainty (e.g. “I’m not sure; it’s a 50-50 chance”). Also, Borland (1997) identified that 
respondents often used linear rating scales to represent subjective concern (i.e. the extent to 
which the individual is worried about a risk factor), rather than to provide probability estimates. 
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Consequently, the evidence indicates that when it is not made explicit to a participant what 
beliefs/judgements he/she should represent in his/her response, there is the possibility that they 
will provide data that reflects beliefs or judgements that differ from those under investigation. 
A further reason why risk model (cf. risk magnitude) judgements may be advantageous in 
research concerning subjective judgements of synergistic risks is that individuals often have 
difficulty in accurately representing their perceptions of risk magnitudes in numerical/linear 
formats (Borland, 1997; Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin, 1999; Windschitl, 2000). This may be 
because risk perceptions are not necessarily pre-formed as numerical probability estimates, but 
are often basic beliefs or fuzzy representations concerning the likelihood of potential threats 
(Brown & Morley, 2007; Eiser, 1994; Sjoberg, 2000). Also, research indicates that single-point 
risk estimates may not necessarily reflect an individual’s more intuitive understanding of risk 
and uncertainty (Borland, 1997; Flugstad & Windschitl, 2003; Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick, 
1993; Windschitl, 2002; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Hence, the task of representing risk 
perceptions as single-point risk estimates, both for single and combined risk factors, may either 
be unfamiliar or counterintuitive for many individuals; particularly, when it is unclear that the 
estimates should represent the effects of possible interactions. Thus, compared to the 
requirements of a linear rating scale, risk model judgements are advantageous because (a) less 
onus is placed on the respondent to be numerically-specific when providing a risk estimate and 
(b) the respondent can express a conceptual understanding of the directional effects of combining 
two specific risk factors in terms of a risk model,. Risk model judgements may, therefore, be 
more suited to enabling individuals to express an understanding of synergistic risk, particularly 
when that understanding is more tacitly, than numerically, encoded. 
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Examining the efficacy of risk model judgements in synergy studies 
Whilst Condit and Shen’s study has effectively illustrated how risk model judgements can be 
employed in research concerning subjective risk judgements for multiple factors, their 
application of this approach has a number of limitations. First, the approach was only used to 
assess judgements for one risk factor combination. Hence, although Condit and Shen reported 
that their results indicate the approach is “… a psychometrically valid scale …” (Condit & Shen, 
2011, p. 115), this conclusion seems somewhat premature given that it is unclear whether the 
results were an artefact of the approach. That is, because the participants were not asked to 
provide risk model judgements for other combinations, it is not possible to determine whether 
the results are specific to the combination or specific to the response metric. Second, participants 
in Condit and Shen’s study were asked to provide risk model judgements in response to a written 
scenario that used numerical data to describe the likelihood of heart disease for an individual 
who had both a genetic predisposition to the disease and unhealthy eating habits (e.g. the 
scenario stated that the gene increases the risk by 20%, and the eating habits increase the risk by 
20%; participants were asked to judge whether the two factors operating together would result in 
a risk that was less than, equal to or more than 40%). As Condit and Shen identified (p. 122), the 
provision of numerical data may have framed the judgement task as a mathematical problem and, 
therefore, induced participants to employ numerically reasoning to ‘solve the problem’. Previous 
research by Dawson, Johnson and Luke (2012a) shows that individuals who reason numerically 
when formulating a judgement about the risk attributable to combined factors often arrive at an 
additive risk model because they believe that the numerical risks ‘add up’ (i.e. 20% + 20% = 
40%) consistent with the notion of ‘adding’ (i.e. combining) one risk factor to another. Hence, 
the use of a numerical frame by Condit and Shen could have influenced many participants to 
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reason mathematically and, consequently, to be biased towards adopting an additive risk model. 
Third, it is unclear from Condit and Shen’s findings why different risk model judgements 
emerged within a relatively homogenous group of participants (i.e. approximately two-thirds of 
the sample indicated an additive risk model, and one-third indicated a synergistic risk model). 
That is, it is not known whether the different judgements arose due to different varieties of 
experience or knowledge within the group and, if so, what was the nature of this experience or 
knowledge. In other words, the study did not provide sufficient insight into the key question of 
why it is that some individuals do and others do not understand that certain factor combinations 
present synergistic risks. The two studies presented in this paper are aimed at addressing the 
concerns indicated above. 
 Several previous studies have assessed the validity of different psychometric scales 
employed to measure subjective risk judgements for combined hazards (e.g., French et al. 2002, 
2004, 2006; Hampson, Andrews, Barckley, Lee & Lichtenstein, 2003). These assessments have 
typically been made via two approaches: First, the risk judgments obtained by the metric(s) are 
compared to anticipated results. For example, Hampson et al. (2003) predicted that the 
synergistic risk attributable to drinking-and-driving would be familiar to most people, and that a 
metric which obtained risk judgements reflecting knowledge of this synergy could be considered 
valid. Second, multiple metrics are employed, and the risk judgements obtained by each metric 
are compared; agreement between these judgements is interpreted as an indicator of validity. 
However, two distinct problems have emerged with this latter approach. First, there have been 
instances where two scales demonstrate agreement in one comparative study (indicating 
validity), but do not demonstrate agreement in another (see French et al., 2002, 2006). Second, 
where disagreement between different metrics is identified, there is no ‘gold standard’ measure 
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to which the results obtained from either metric can be compared for validation purposes. 
Consequently, in making our assessment of the validity of risk model judgements, we adopted 
the former approach and compared the results we obtained to predicted results. This approach 
can be described as an assessment of criterion-related validity (Litwin, 2003), and we adopted 
this method because it avoids the uncertainties, as described above, of assessing validity via 
comparisons between multiple metrics. 
 In Study 1, participants were asked to provide risk model judgements for one of three 
combinations that present synergistic health risks: alcohol-driving (= fatal collision), aspirin-
clopidogrel (= internal bleeding), or radon-tobacco (= lung cancer). This design facilitated an 
assessment of whether risk model judgements would vary according to the factor combination 
under consideration and, therefore, whether the risk model approach is sufficiently sensitive to 
record such variations. In addition, in Study 1 the judgement task was presented to participants in 
either a numerical or verbal frame. This feature of the study design enabled an assessment of 
whether the framing of the risk model judgement task would influence participant’s responses. 
Clearly, different responses between the numeric and verbal frames would suggest that the 
judgements were dependent on the description of the task at hand and, therefore, that the risk 
model metric may be low in face validity. However, it is important to note that our intention was 
not to address the broader question of whether numeric representations of risk influence or 
inhibit perceptions of synergistic risks in general. In Study 2, participants provided risk model 
judgements for the pharmaceutical combination of aspirin and clopidogrel. Participants consisted 
of one group of lay individuals and one group of domain experts (i.e. Independent Prescribers, 
such as doctors and pharmacists, who are qualified to prescribed drugs; referred to hereafter as 
‘IPs’). Importantly, the use of these two groups facilitated an assessment of whether risk model 
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judgements vary according to domain-specific knowledge and/or experience and, therefore, 
whether the risk model format was sufficiently sensitive to record this difference. Moreover, 
Studies 1 and 2 were designed to provide insights into the extent to which knowledge and/or 
experience of each risk factor combination might mediate whether an individual understands that 
the combination presents a synergistic risk. 
 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred-and-six participants (49 men, 56 women, and 1 who did not indicate his/her 
gender) aged 18 to 75 (M = 35.79, SD = 17.69) were recruited online via five websites dedicated 
to social science research (e.g., www.onlinesocialpsychology.org, 
www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk, etc.). Forty-three percent of participants were resident in the 
US, 40% in the UK and the remaining 17% in one of nine other Asian, Australasian, European or 
North American countries. Twenty-eight percent had completed a secondary/high school 
education, 27% had completed some postsecondary schooling and 44% had a university 
education. Participants were not rewarded for taking part in the study. 
 
Design 
The experiment followed a 3 (risk factor combination: alcohol and driving, radon and tobacco, 
aspirin and clopidogrel) x 2 (frame: numerical, verbal) design, with both factors as between-
subjects. The dependent variable was the subjective risk model attributable to the factor 
combination (risk model: sub-additive, additive, or synergistic). 
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The three risk factor combinations presented in Study 1 have all been found, in practice, 
to present synergistic risks: alcohol-driving (Cherpitel, Tam, Midanik, Caetano, & Greenfield, 
1995; Institute for Alcohol Studies, 2010; Office for National Statistics, 2009), aspirin-
clopidogrel (Delaney, Opatrny, Brophy, & Suiss, 2007; Hallas et al., 2006) and radon-tobacco 
(Barros-Dios et al., 2002; Darby et al., 2005; Pershagen et al., 1994).
1
 These combinations were 
selected to provide a set of synergistic risk combinations that were each likely to be of different 
degrees of familiarity to the participants and, therefore, could facilitate an assessment of the 
extent to which prior knowledge/experience of the combination would influence the participant’s 
risk model judgements. Specifically, the synergistic risk of a fatal accident for the alcohol-
driving combination would probably be familiar to most participants because of (a) widespread 
public awareness campaigns, (b) laws that prohibit drinking and driving (which implies that the 
factor combination is dangerous) and (c) the ease with which individuals can understand, 
whether as a result of direct or vicarious experience, that a serious accident is much more likely 
if the driver has a severely impaired ability to concentrate, judge distances, react quickly, etc. 
due to alcohol consumption. By contrast, the synergistic risk of gastro-intestinal bleeding 
presented by the aspirin-clopidogrel combination would probably not be familiar to most lay 
individuals and, therefore, it is unlikely that the study’s participants would know much/anything 
about any potential risks and/or benefits of combining the two drugs. The extent to which the 
synergistic risk attributable to radon-tobacco would be familiar to the participants is unclear. 
More specifically, in contrast to the alcohol-driving combination, (a) the risk of combining radon 
and tobacco has not been highlighted by widespread public campaigns, (b) the combination is 
not prohibited in law and (c) the underlying mechanism for the radon-tobacco synergistic risk is 
unlikely to be understood by the participants, as the mechanistic process is complex and not yet 
14 
 
fully understood by scientists (Harley, Chittaporn, Heikkinen, Meyers, & Robbins, 2008). 
However, authors of both US- and UK-based studies, each employing different response metrics, 
have reported that participants judged the risk attributable to the radon-tobacco combination as 
synergistic (Eiser, Reicher, & Podpadec, 1995; Hampson et al., 2000). 
 
Materials 
The judgement task presented to each participant started with a short paragraph, comprised of 
two sentences, which participants read first (see Appendix). The first sentence stated that 
research evidence showed that the likelihood of an adverse outcome (e.g. gastro-intestinal 
bleeding) increased for an individual exposed to a specific single risk factor (e.g. taking aspirin). 
The second sentence stated that research evidence showed the likelihood of that same adverse 
outcome also increased for an individual exposed to a different single risk factor (e.g. taking the 
drug ‘clopidogrel’). The wording employed in these two sentences was manipulated so that 
participants were presented with information that described the likelihood of the adverse 
outcome in either a ‘verbal’ or a ‘numeric’ frame. Specifically, participants in the verbal 
condition read sentences that described the likelihood as “an increased chance” for each factor. 
In contrast, participants in the numeric condition read sentences that described the likelihood for 
each factor in the form of a relative frequency, which had been derived from empirical research 
data (e.g. “a 1 in 100,000 chance”). Hence, participants in the verbal condition, unlike those in 
the numeric condition, were not provided with the ‘objective’ risk magnitude and, therefore, 
made their own subjective assessment of the risk attributable to each constituent factor. All 
relative frequencies (see Table 1) reported in the numeric condition featured the same 
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denominator to avoid the introduction of an unwanted framing effect (see Lipkus, 2007; Okan, 
Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2011). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
After the first paragraph, participants were instructed to consider the likelihood of an 
individual experiencing the adverse outcome, as mentioned in the first paragraph (e.g. gastro-
intestinal bleeding), when exposed to both factors (e.g., aspirin and clopidogrel). Participants 
were then asked to state, using a multiple-choice response format, whether they judged this 
likelihood to be “less than”, “equal to” or “more than” the likelihood for an individual exposed 
to only the first factor (e.g. aspirin) “added to” the likelihood for an individual exposed to only 
the second factor (e.g. clopidogrel). The layout, style and content of the judgment task were 
developed in accordance with guidelines outlined by Osterlind (1998) for the construction of 
multiple-choice response items. 
Having completed the judgement task, participants then read the following instruction 
“Please indicate how confident you are that your judgment (i.e., less than, equal to, or more 
than) in the previous task represents what has been found in scientific research, where: 0% = “I 
have no idea whether my judgment represents what has been found in scientific research” 
and 100% = “I am certain my judgment represents what has been found in scientific research”.” 
To respond to this question, participants could select one of eleven categorical options 
distributed in ten percent intervals (i.e. 0%, 10%, 20% … 100%). The purpose of this question 
was to measure the extent to which participant’s believed that their risk model judgements were 
veridical (i.e. consistent with whether the ‘objective’ evidence indicates the risk model is sub-
additive, additive or synergistic) and, therefore, whether participants believed they were drawing 
on knowledge of objective data to formulate a veridical subjective judgement.  In addition, 
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participants were asked to state whether, prior to participating in the study, they were aware that 
(a) aspirin increases the risk of gastrointestinal bleeding, (b) clopidogrel increases the risk of 
gastrointestinal bleeding and (c) radon exposure increases the risk of lung cancer (it was assumed 
that participants would be aware that either alcohol use or vehicle driving increases the risk of an 
accident and that tobacco smoking increases the risk of lung cancer). 
 
Procedure 
Each participant was presented with the experimental materials via an online survey system. The 
system randomly allocated participants to receive one judgement task concerning either the 
alcohol-driving, radon-tobacco or aspirin-clopidogrel combinations. The system also randomly 
allocated participants to receive the judgement task in either the numerical or verbal frame. Each 
‘factor combination group’ consisted of 17 or 18 participants who received the task in a verbal 
frame and 17 or 18 who received the same task in the numeric frame. Participants were advised 
that they had an unlimited time to participate in the study (M = 10 minutes 28 seconds), to 
complete the questions in a place where they would not be distracted and not to consult any 
materials or persons whilst participating.
2
 
 
Statistical analysis 
The dependent and independent variables in Study 1 were, primarily, categorical variables. In 
order to test for main effects and interactions between these variables, we analysed the data using 
hierarchical loglinear analysis. Significant interactions were further analysed using chi-square 
(2) tests. The data concerning the extent to which each participant believed his/hers risk 
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judgements to be veridical was treated as a continuous variable, and was analysed using 
ANOVAs. 
 
Results 
Risk judgements 
Categorical risk judgements for each of the three combinations are displayed in Figure 1. An 
initial visual inspection of this descriptive data indicated that a majority of participants judged 
that the alcohol-driving and tobacco-radon combinations would present a synergistic risk (77% 
and 74%, respectively). However, the proportion of participants who judged that the aspirin-
clopidogrel combination would present a synergistic risk (42%) was approximately equal to the 
proportion who judged that the combination would present an additive risk. These observations 
presented the first indication that the metric employed was sufficiently sensitive to record 
variations in risk model judgements for different risk factor combinations. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 Before the hierarchical loglinear analysis was performed, an assessment was made to 
determine whether the data met the test assumption that no less than 20% of the data cells should 
have expected frequencies less than 5 (Field, 2009). However, because few participants judged 
the risk attributable to the combined factors as ‘sub-additive’, the data did not meet this 
assumption for three-way analyses (77% of cells featured expected frequencies less that 5). 
Consequently, the ‘additive’ and ‘sub-additive’ categories were collapsed into one category, 
which resulted in two categories for the risk model variable (i.e. ‘synergistic’ and ‘non-
synergistic’). Collapsing categories in this way is common in research that employs hierarchical 
loglinear analysis (e.g. Chung, 1996; Fairclough, Boddy, Hackett, & Stratton, 2009), and is 
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appropriate in circumstances, such as those here, where the research objectives (i.e. investigating 
whether or not participants judged the risk attributable to the factor combinations as a synergistic 
risk) are not impeded (Field, 2009). Collapsing the categories resulted in data that met the test 
assumptions and made the three-way analysis viable. 
 
Risk judgements, risk factor combination, and framing 
To assess whether participants’ judgements varied according to factor combination and/or task 
frame, a three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis was performed: risk model x factor 
combination x frame. This identified a significant main effect for risk model, χ2 (1) = 8.61, p < 
0.01, that was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between the factor combination and 
risk model, χ2 (2) = 11.91, p < 0.01. The main effect for risk model was attributable to the greater 
proportion of factor combinations overall that were judged to present a synergistic risk (64%) 
rather than a non-synergistic risk (36%), χ2 (1) = 8.49, p < 0.01. The two-way interaction 
between factor combination and risk model was investigated via separate analysis of 
participants’ risk judgements for each factor combination. This revealed that a significantly 
greater proportion of participants judged that the alcohol-driving combination would present a 
synergistic (cf. non-synergistic) risk, χ2 (1) = 10.31, p < 0.001. Similarly, a significant majority 
of participants in the radon-tobacco group judged that the combination would present a 
synergistic (cf. non-synergistic) risk, χ2 (1) = 8.26, p < 0.01. However, there was no significant 
difference between the proportion of participants who judged that the aspirin-clopidogrel 
combination would present a synergistic (42%) and a non-synergistic risk (58%), χ2 (1) = 1.00, p 
= 0.32. No other significant interactions or main effects were found, χ2s (1) <= 0.73, ps > 0.39.  
Hence, the results showed that the participants’ risk judgements did not differ significantly 
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whether they were presented with the judgement task in a numeric or verbal frame. This was the 
case irrespective of the factor combination under consideration.
3
 
  
Confidence in veridicality of risk judgements 
A 3 (factor combination) x 2 (frame) independent measures ANOVA was performed on the 
veridicality judgement data. This identified that the differences in veridicality judgements 
between the aspirin-clopidogrel (M = 53.61, SD = 29.19), radon-tobacco (M = 61.14, SD = 
32.88) and alcohol-driving (M = 67.35, SD = 29.57) groups were not significant, F(2, 99) = 1.72, 
p = 0.19. Furthermore, the difference in veridicality judgements between the numeric (M = 
61.92, SD = 31.00) and verbal (M = 59.25, SD = 30.88) frame conditions were also non-
significant, F(1, 99) = 0.19, p = 0.66. Although a significant interaction was identified between 
factor combination and frame, F(2, 99) = 4.97, p < 0.01, simple effects tests (employing a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons) for each factor combination indicated that the 
differences between judgements in each framing condition were not significant, ts(18) <= 2.36; 
ps > 0.028. Specifically, for the aspirin-clopidogrel combination, judgements in the numeric 
frame condition (M = 62.22, SD = 24.15) were higher than in the verbal frame condition (M = 
45.00, SD = 31.86); similarly, for the radon-tobacco combination, judgements were higher in the 
numeric condition (M = 67.78, SD = 31.54) than the verbal condition (M = 54.12, SD = 33.74); 
however, for the alcohol-driving combination judgements were lower in the numeric condition 
(M = 55.00, SD = 37.24) than the verbal condition (M = 78.33, SD = 14.25). 
 
Discussion 
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The results of Study 1 indicate that the risk model judgement format is sufficiently sensitive to 
record different risk judgements for different combinations. In other words, the judgements do 
not appear to be purely an artefact of the ‘risk model judgement’ metric. Furthermore, 
participants’ risk model judgements did not differ as a result of manipulations in the framing of 
the judgement task (i.e. numerical vs. verbal). That is, the provision of either numerical or verbal 
risk magnitude information did not lead to a disproportionate increase in one specific risk model 
judgements. Hence, the results offer some evidence towards the format’s face validity, as the 
translation of the risk model construct did not vary according to the task frame. 
 In assessing the results of Study 1 from an epistemological perspective, it is pertinent to 
consider the mediating effect of the familiarity of the risk factor combination. Certainly, the 
familiarity of the potentially adverse effects of combining alcohol and driving provides a sound 
explanation for the finding that a large majority of participants understood that the combination 
presents a synergistic risk. Similarly, the unfamiliarity of the potential adverse effects of 
combining aspirin and clopidogrel (only 14% of participants reported that prior to the study they 
were aware that separate use of clopidogrel can lead to gastrointestinal bleeding) provides a 
plausible explanation for the finding that less half the participants understood that the 
combination presents a synergistic risk. From this perspective, the finding that a large majority of 
the participants judged that the radon-tobacco combination presents a synergistic risk would 
suggest that the harmful effects of this combination were familiar to many of the participants. 
However, further analysis did not support this interpretation. That is, within the radon-tobacco 
condition, the risk model judgements of participants who reported that they were/were not 
previously aware that exposure to radon increases the risk of lung cancer (n = 20/15) did not 
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differ significantly, χ2 (2) = 0.45, p = 0.50. This then raises the question of why a majority of the 
participants in Study 1 judged that the radon-tobacco combination presents a synergistic risk. 
Whilst it is highly unlikely that the participants would have formulated a detailed mental 
model of the complex bio-chemical interaction between radon and tobacco, the participants may 
have constructed a more rudimentary mental model that encapsulated the vulnerability of the 
human body to the potent effects of simultaneous expose to tobacco toxins and radiation. Such 
an intuitive understanding of synergistic risk has been identified in previous research (see 
Dawson, Johnson & Luke, 2012a) and, therefore, might also offer a partial explanation for other 
evidence indicating that individuals may hold synergistic models of risk for the radon-tobacco 
combination (Eiser et al., 1995; Hampson et al., 2000). However, this interpretation raises the 
additional question of why a majority of participants did not employ this intuitive synergistic risk 
model when making a judgement for the aspirin-clopidogrel combination? A possible 
explanation is that, as indicated earlier, most individuals probably know very little about the 
effects of combining aspirin and clopidogrel and, more specifically, whether these two drugs 
might also result in health benefits as well as risks. Notably, research shows that lay individuals 
tend to perceive most medicinal drugs as beneficial (Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992), and that 
subjective judgements’ of risks and benefits are often confounded in individuals’ minds 
(Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Consequently, it is 
possible that many of the participants in Study 1 believed that the overall risk for the aspirin-
clopidogrel combination may be attenuated by the potential health benefits of the combination. 
This may have led them to perceive the two drugs as a safer combination, rather than a 
combination that would present a synergistic risk. The finding that the highest number of non-
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synergistic risk judgements was observed in the aspirin-clopidogrel condition provides evidence 
in support of this interpretation. 
Taken together, the results of Study 1 indicate that (a) prior knowledge of (i.e. familiarity 
with) the harmful effects of combining two risk factors can aid judgements that the combination 
presents a synergistic risk, yet (b) prior knowledge of the harmful effects of combining certain 
factors is not necessarily a prerequisite to arrive at a judgement that a risk factor combination 
(e.g. radon and smoking) presents a synergistic risk. The results also show that participants’ 
confidence about the calibration of their subjective judgements with ‘objective’ scientific risk 
assessments did not vary significantly between the three ‘factor combination’ conditions. This 
suggests that awareness of ‘objective’ data may not be a prerequisite for understanding that 
specific factor combinations present synergistic risks and that many individuals may base their 
risk model judgements on experiential knowledge and/or intuitive cognitions. Again, this could 
explain why many participants attributed a synergistic risk model to the radon-tobacco 
combination irrespective of whether they had some prior knowledge of the scientific literature 
concerning the risk attributable to the factors. 
 
STUDY 2 
If the absence of pharmacological/domain-specific knowledge concerning the risk/benefits of the 
aspirin-clopidogrel combination was a factor that influenced judgements in Study 1, then one 
might expect that individuals with such knowledge (i.e. IPs) would judge that a synergistic risk is 
attributable to the combination. Similarly, one might also expect IPs to be more confident 
regarding the extent to which their risk judgements for the combination are veridical. To 
investigate these predictions, a second study was conducted in which a group of IPs and a group 
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of lay individuals were asked to judge whether the risk attributable to the combination of aspirin-
clopidogrel was less than, equal to or more than the sum of the risk for each of the constituent 
drugs. Importantly, the data obtained in this study facilitated an assessment of the discriminant 
validity of the risk model task format. That is, a significant difference between the responses of 
the two groups would provide evidence of the formats capacity to distinguish between different 
risk model judgements for different populations (Laver-Fawcett, 2007). 
 
Method 
Participants 
To recruit a sample of IPs and a sample of non-experts matched to the IPs on key socio-
demographics (i.e., age, gender, education, and national residence), chain-referral sampling was 
employed (Penrod, Preston, Cain, & Starks, 2003). We initially made contact with individuals 
(known as ‘gatekeepers’) who, by virtue of their employment, were in a position to recruit other 
individuals that met the socio-demographic profile suitable for participation in the study (Penrod 
et al., 2003). Several gatekeepers were employed in the recruitment of both IPs and non-experts 
to minimise selection bias (Atkinson & Flint, 2003), and the gatekeepers did not participate in 
the study. Participants and gatekeepers were not rewarded for taking part in the study. 
The sample of IPs (n = 31) were recruited by five gatekeepers, who were either 
participants in a university alumni network, mediated an online forum for pharmacists or chaired 
a professional association for UK pharmacists. The recruited participants consisted of 17 men 
and 13 women (one participant’s gender not stated), and their ages ranged from 28 to 59 years 
(M = 42.40, SD = 9.97). We established, via a questionnaire, that the 31 participants met all of 
the following criteria: resided in the UK, had qualified to independently prescribe prescription-
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only drugs, were employed in a role where they independently prescribed drugs and considered 
the potential for adverse drug-drug interactions at least once per week in their professional role. 
Our sample of non-experts (n = 30) were recruited by six gatekeepers from a range of 
UK-based public and private sector organisations. The sample of participants held a variety of 
professional positions that included Head Teacher, Project Manager, Financial Analyst, 
Administrator and Chartered Accountant. The non-expert participants were matched to the IPs in 
terms of being UK residents, aged between 26 and 64 (M = 39.73, SD = 10.14) and educated to 
Bachelor’s Degree level or higher. Consistent with the IP group, the non-expert group consisted 
of 14 men and 16 women. There was no significant difference between the mean age of the IP 
and non-expert groups, t(58) = 1.03, p = 0.31, and there was no significant difference between 
the proportion of men/women in the two groups, χ2 (1) = 0.60, p = 0.27. Questionnaire-elicited 
data was obtained from the non-expert participants to ensure none of them met the criteria for 
inclusion in the IP group (see above). 
 
Design 
The experiment followed a 2 (domain expertise: IP, non-expert) x 2 (frame: numerical, verbal) 
design with both factors as between-subjects. The dependent variable was the subjective risk 
model attributable to the factor combination (risk model: sub-additive, additive, or synergistic). 
 
Materials 
The design of the judgement task materials presented to each participant replicated that 
employed in Study 1, but in Study 2, only the aspirin-clopidogrel judgement task was presented. 
After completing the task, participants provided veridicality judgements (as per Study 1) and 
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were asked to state whether, prior to participation in the study, they were aware that (a) use of 
aspirin increases the risk of gastro-intestinal bleeding and (b) use of clopidogrel increases the 
risk of gastro-intestinal bleeding. 
 
Procedure 
The experimental materials were presented to all participants via an online survey system. The 
system randomly allocated the judgement task in either the numerical or verbal frame within 
both the non-expert and IP groups. Participants received the same instructions provided in Study 
1. The mean participation time was 10 minutes 47 seconds. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Data analysis was performed as per Study 1. As observed in Study 1, the proportion of cells with 
an expected count of 5 or more was not sufficient to meet the assumption for a three-way 
hierarchical loglinear analysis (58% of cells featuring expected frequencies less that 5). To 
overcome this issue, the ‘additive’ and ‘sub-additive’ categories were collapsed into one 
category (i.e., ‘non-synergistic’). This resulted in data that met the test assumptions, making the 
three-way analysis viable.  
 
Results 
Risk judgements 
Categorical risk judgements for both the non-expert and IP groups are displayed in Figure 2. An 
initial visual inspection of this descriptive data indicated that a majority (68%) of the IPs judged 
that the combination would present a synergistic risk. In contrast, the proportion of non-experts 
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who judged that the combination would present a synergistic risk (37%) was equal to the 
proportion who judged that the combination would present an additive risk. These observations 
presented the first indication that the risk model format possessed discriminant validity. 
 In the following inferential analysis, the ‘additive’ and ‘sub-additive’ categories were 
collapsed into one category. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Risk judgements, expertise, and framing 
To assess whether participants’ risk judgements varied according to expertise and/or task frame, 
a three-way hierarchical loglinear analysis was performed: risk model x domain expertise x 
frame. This identified a significant two-way interaction between expertise and risk model, χ2 (1) 
= 5.99, p < 0.05. No other significant interactions or main effects were found, χ2s (1) <= 0.41, ps 
> 0.52. Hence, participants’ risk judgements did not differ significantly between the numeric or 
verbal frame conditions and this was the case across both the IP and non-expert groups. 
The two-way interaction between expertise and risk model was investigated via separate 
analyses of risk judgements for each expertise group. This revealed that a significantly greater 
proportion of IPs judged that the aspirin-clopidogrel combination would present a synergistic, 
rather than non-synergistic, risk, χ2 (1) = 3.90, p < 0.05. However, there was no significant 
difference between the proportion of non-experts who judged that this combination would 
present a synergistic risk and those who judged that the combination would not, χ2 (1) = 2.13, p = 
0.14. 
 
Confidence in veridicality of risk judgements 
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A 2 (domain expertise) x 2 (frame) independent measures ANOVA was performed on the 
veridicality judgement data. This identified a significant main effect for expertise, F(2, 57) = 
3.14, p = 0.04 (employing a lopsided test of significance; Abelson, 1995; Levine & Banas, 
2002), with IPs being significantly more confident (M = 57.10, SD = 32.48) than non-experts (M 
= 42.67, SD = 30.00) regarding the extent to which their risk model judgements were veridical. 
However, no other significant main effects or interactions were identified, Fs(1, 57) > 0.47, ps < 
0.40. 
 
Prior knowledge of constituent risk factors 
Ninety-four-percent of IPs reported that prior to participation in the study he/she was aware that 
separate use of either aspirin or clopidogrel increases the risk of gastro-intestinal bleeding. By 
contrast, only ten percent of non-experts reported being aware of this side-effect for separate use 
of both drugs. 
 
Discussion 
Importantly, the results of Study 2 demonstrate that the format can help to distinguish between 
different response patterns for different groups; thus, providing evidence of the format’s 
discriminant validity. Also, the similarity between the judgement pattern observed for the 
aspirin-clopidogrel combination in Study 1 and for the non-experts in Study 2 offers some 
evidence of the format’s external validity. Moreover, Study 2 revealed no effect for the 
verbal/numeric framing manipulations. This provides further evidence that the risk model 
judgement task provides a valid means of assessing risk judgements for combined factors. 
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 Previous studies examining the risk judgements of experts indicate that experts are more 
likely to show “good” judgemental performance when the ecological validity (i.e. the degree to 
which the expert makes a judgement within their professional domain) and the learnability (i.e. 
the degree to which the experts’ judgemental veridicality has been improved by the availability 
of objective data or usable feedback) of the judgement task are high (Bolger & Wright, 1994; 
Rowe & Wright, 2001). The evidence from Study 2 suggests that the judgement task was more 
ecologically valid for the IPs because this group of participants (a) regularly considered the 
effects of drug-drug interactions in their work role and (b) were much more aware of the side-
effects attributable to both aspirin and clopidogrel when taken independently. The results also 
suggest that learnability probably played a role in the IPs’ risk model judgements, because this 
group of participants was more confident that their judgements were consistent with objective 
risk assessments for the aspirin-clopidogrel combination. Hence, the judgement task presented to 
participants in Study 2 appears to have been one that was higher in ecological validity and 
learnability for participants in the IP group. It, therefore, seems reasonable to assert that these 
two factors played a role in the judgements made by the IPs, who demonstrated greater 
veridicality (cf. non-experts) in their risk judgements for the factor combination of aspirin-
clopidogrel. 
 
General Discussion 
The two studies presented here provide evidence supporting the validity of using risk model 
judgements to assess whether individuals understand that a particular combination of factors 
presents a synergistic risk. Furthermore, the results of the two studies also provide important 
insights into some of the factors that may mediate such an understanding. Importantly, the results 
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of Study 1 showed that many lay individuals can/do make veridical risk judgements for factor 
combinations that have been found, in practice, to present synergistic risks. However, it is of 
concern that both Studies 1 and 2 also found that, for lay individuals, this veridicality does not 
necessarily extend to all factor combinations. Reassuringly, the greater proportion of veridical 
risk model judgements made by the domain-experts in Study 2 indicates that knowledge of the 
synergistic risk attributable to certain combinations can be learned. This suggests that laypersons 
should also be able to acquire a more veridical understanding of the synergistic risk attributable 
to certain factor combinations, provided they are exposed to effective learning opportunities (for 
supporting evidence see Dawson, Johnson & Luke, 2012c). 
 One possible interpretation of the results of Study 1 could be that perceptions of 
synergistic risks are inversely proportionate to the ratio of the difference of risk magnitude 
between each constituent risk factor (the drug interaction ratio is 10:1, radon tobacco 17:4 and 
alcohol-driving 3:1). That is, individuals may be less likely to arrive at a synergistic model of 
risk when the constituent risk factors differ greatly in risk magnitude. However, the results of 
both our studies highlight two reasons to question this possible interpretation. First, in both 
studies the exact details of the risk magnitudes were provided to the participants in the ‘numeric 
frame’ conditions (hence, these participants could have used this information to identify the 
ratios). Yet, the results showed that the judgements made by these “informed” participants did 
not differ significantly from those of the “uninformed” participants in the ‘verbal’ frame 
condition (who were only advised that each risk factor presented “an increased chance” of the 
relevant adverse outcome). Second, it seems reasonable to infer that, due to their education and 
experience, the group of ‘domain experts’ in Study 2 would be more likely than the group of 
‘non-experts’ to possess veridical knowledge of the separate risk magnitudes attributable to each 
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of the two drugs (aspirin and clopidogrel). Therefore, these experts would be more likely to 
possess a veridical understanding of the ratio of difference in the risk magnitudes of each drug 
(i.e., 10:1). However, the results of Study 2 show that it was the group of non-experts (cf. 
‘experts’) who were less likely to arrive at a synergistic risk model for the aspirin-clopidogrel 
combination. Hence, the evidence from both studies indicates that knowledge of the specific risk 
magnitudes attributable to each constituent factor (and, therefore, knowledge of the difference of 
the ratio between the constituent risks) does not influence the risk judgments for the combination 
of factors. 
The flip-side of the findings from Study 2 is that nearly a third of the IPs did not 
demonstrate an awareness of the synergistic risk attributable to the aspirin-clopidogrel 
combination. Hence, consideration should also be given to how this lack of awareness might lead 
IPs to prescribe hazardous drug combinations and, therefore, how improving the accuracy of 
such risk judgements amongst IPs could lead to improvements in poly-pharmaceutical patient 
care. Extrapolating further, the non-veridical risk model judgements by some IPs suggests that it 
would be wrong to assume that expertise, in any domain, invariably leads to accurate risk model 
judgements for combined factors. 
The data obtained in both studies reflects participants’ risk model judgements, and not 
specific risk magnitude estimates. Hence, one could argue that, even where a person judges that a 
combination presents a synergistic risk, the individual may still not have an accurate 
understanding of the combination’s specific risk magnitude and that this might impede sound 
risk-related decision making. However, it may be too much to expect most non-experts to make 
precise estimates of synergistic risk magnitudes, because this is a complex task requiring an 
understanding of the way such magnitudes vary in relation to the intensity, duration, proximity 
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and frequency of exposure to each constituent factor (Berenbaum, 1989; Cogliano, 1997). It, 
therefore, seems more pragmatic for researchers to focus on assessing whether individuals 
understand that a specific factor combinations present a synergistic model of risk, rather than to 
attempt to assess whether they are aware of the exact extent to which the combined risk exceeds 
the sum of the constituent risks (for a similar assertion see Hampson et al., 2003, p.1029). Hence, 
there is clearly a case for assessing risk model (cf. magnitude) judgements and, therefore, for 
employing the metric successfully utilised in the studies presented here. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
There are some limitations to the present research that could be addressed by future studies. 
First, only risk judgements for synergistic risk combinations were assessed and, therefore, the 
extent to which individuals’ judgements for sub-additive or additive risk combinations are 
veridical was not assessed. Similarly, the extent of the validity and reliability of the risk model 
metric may only be firmly established via a greater number and variety of applications. Hence, 
future studies should use the risk model metric under controlled conditions to assess judgements 
for a wide range of sub-additive, additive and synergistic risk combinations, in relation to a 
variety of domains (e.g. health, ecological, social, etc.), and with respondents of varying degrees 
of domain expertise. Second, the comparison of the judgements of non-experts and domain-
experts focused on only one drug-drug combination and, consequently, the differences identified 
in the study may or may not be evident for judgements of other drug combinations. Third, the 
use of internet-based samples provided many advantages (e.g. access to hard-to-reach 
populations, a diverse sample, etc.; see Reips, 2000) but limited the ability to control the 
conditions under which each participant operated; hence, some unknown biases may exist in the 
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data (e.g. multiple participation by one individual). Fourth, whilst our results indicate that risk 
model judgements do not vary according to the task frame (i.e., numeric vs. non-numeric), we 
suggest that caution is exercised in assuming that (a) variations in other aspects of the task frame 
will not influence judgments or (b) task frames will not influence judgments when other response 
metrics are employed. Fifth, we assessed the validity of the risk model metric by comparing the 
participants’ judgements to anticipated results. We recognise that the validity of our findings 
largely rests on the extent to which the original rationale(s) for the anticipated results are deemed 
to be reliable and accurate. Future research in this field could aim to increase the robustness of 
the rationale(s) behind such anticipated results. For example, literature-informed rationales such 
as those utilised in our studies could be bolstered, for instance, by conducting pre-test interviews 
with individuals from the target population to explore the extent to which they demonstrate the 
anticipated awareness of the synergistic risks under investigation. Finally, our studies employed 
three risk factor combinations that varied in terms of (a) the magnitude of risk attributable to 
each of the constituent factors and (b) the ratio of difference in the risk magnitude attributable to 
each constituent factor within each combination. Future research could specifically examine 
whether either of these two variables influence an individual’s risk model judgements for 
combined risk factors. For example, research could explore the possibility that individuals may 
be more inclined to arrive at a synergistic risk model judgement when both constituent factors 
present a relatively ‘high’ perceived risk, and whether individuals are less inclined to arrive at a 
synergistic model of risk when either one or both constituent factors is perceived to present a 
relatively ‘low’ or ‘negligible’ risk. To our knowledge, there is an absence of empirical studies 
that specifically assess the potential influence of these two variables. 
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Conclusion 
The accumulation of evidence showing that various factor combinations present synergistic risks 
highlights a pressing need to learn more about individuals’ understanding of this issue. Based on 
the results of the two studies reported here, the risk model judgement metric has demonstrated 
that it can serve as a useful tool for addressing this need. Furthermore, Study 2 is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first to assess domain-experts’ risk judgements for a factor combination that 
presents a synergistic risk. These studies have helped to identify a number of possible 
explanations as to why some individuals make veridical judgements of synergistic risks and 
others do not. These include familiarity with the harmful effects of combining the factors, and 
the extent to which the judge possesses both domain-specific knowledge and judgemental 
experience concerning the target combination. Consequently, we recommend that future research 
explores the efficacy of interventions/communications that aim to develop these characteristics 
in individuals. However, a vital tool for assessing the relative effectiveness of such 
interventions/communications is a valid method of measuring the recipients’ risk judgements for 
combined factors. The results presented here demonstrate that the risk model judgement metric 
has the potential to fulfil this important task.  
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Footnotes 
1. We could not identify a study that autonomously confirmed/denied that the likelihood of 
having a fatal accident for someone who drives a vehicle whilst intoxicated by alcohol was 
greater than the sum of the likelihood of a fatal accident for someone who does either of 
these two activities alone. However, we considered the risk attributable to alcohol-driving to 
be synergistic. This is because evidence from the Institute for Alcohol Studies (2010) 
indicates that the annual risk of a fatal accident for a person who becomes intoxicated by 
alcohol on an average number of occasions is 1 in 100,000. In addition, evidence from the 
Office for National Statistics (2009) shows that the annual risk of a fatal accident for a person 
who drives a vehicle on a road, an average number of occasions, is 3 in 100,000. Moreover, 
Cherpitel et al. (1995) report that the risk of a fatal accident increases 11-fold for a person 
who drives whilst intoxicated, thus, making the risk of a fatal accident for someone who 
drives a vehicle whilst intoxicated to be approximately 33 in 100,000; this is greater than the 
sum of the risk attributable to each constituent hazard in isolation. 
2. At the end of the questionnaire participants were asked if they had referred to any external 
informational sources to help them answer the questionnaire. Two participants stated that 
they had referred to external sources, so their data was not included in the analysis. 
3. Over 82 percent of the participants in Study 1 were either US (n = 45) or UK (n = 42) 
residents. To assess whether this heterogeneity in residency caused any bias in our data (e.g., 
only the residents in one of the two countries may have been exposed to a public health 
campaign that had made them aware of the synergistic risk attributable to one of the three 
combinations) we examined whether the judgements differed between the participants 
residing in the UK and those residing in the US. The analysis found no significant difference 
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between these two groups in their judgments for the alcohol-driving, aspirin-clopidogrel or 
radon-tobacco combinations (χ2s (1) <= 1.22, ps => 0.35), and there was no significant 
difference when all three factor combinations were treated as a single variable (χ2 (1) = 0.48, 
p = 0.51). Hence, we conclude that it is unlikely that this sample heterogeneity led to a bias 
in our findings.  
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Table 
Table 1. Relative frequencies, as described in each ‘numeric frame’ judgement task, of adverse outcomes following exposure to/use of 
a specific risk factor (frequencies calculated from data source shown). 
Risk Factor 
Combination in 
Judgement Task 
Constituent Risk Factor Adverse Outcome 
Relative 
Frequency of 
Adverse Outcome  
Data Source(s) 
Alcohol – Driving 
Alcohol: becoming intoxicated 
by alcohol an average number of 
times per year 
Fatal accident in any 
given year 
1 in 100,000 
Institute for Alcohol 
Studies (2010) 
Driving: driving vehicle on a 
road an average number of times 
per year 
Fatal accident in any 
given year 
3 in 100,000 
Office for National 
Statistics (2009) 
Aspirin – 
Clopidogrel 
Aspirin: taking a low dose each 
day 
Gastro-intestinal bleeding 
in any given year 
100 in 100,000 Hallas et al. (2006) 
Clopidogrel: taking a low does 
each day 
Gastro-intestinal bleeding 
in any given year 
10 in 100,000 Hallas et al. (2006) 
Radon – Tobacco 
Radon: living in a dwelling 
where there is a high level of 
radon 
Lung cancer during 
lifetime 
4,000 in 100,000 Reif & Heeren (1999) 
Tobacco: smoking 20 cigarettes 
per day throughout adulthood 
Lung cancer during 
lifetime 
17,000 in 100,000 Villeneuve & Mao (1994) 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Study 1: Judgements of the risk model attributable to each risk factor combination (N 
= 106) 
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Figure 2. Study 2: Domain-experts’ (IPs) and non-experts’ judgements of the risk model 
attributable to the aspirin-clopidogrel drug combination (N = 61). 
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Appendix 
Example judgement task featuring the aspirin-clopidogrel combination in a numeric 
frame: 
 
Read the paragraph below and respond to the task by ticking one of the boxes. 
 
Research evidence shows that a person who takes a low-dose of ‘aspirin’ each day has a 100 in 
100,000 chance of suffering gastro-intestinal bleeding in any given year. Research evidence also 
shows that a person who takes a low-dose of the antiplatelet drug ‘clopidogrel’ each day has a 10 
in 100,000 chance of suffering gastro-intestinal bleeding in any given year. 
 
Judgment task: Please now consider the chance of a person suffering gastro-intestinal bleeding 
in any given year if they take a low-dose of aspirin each day and a low-dose of clopidogrel each 
day. 
 
Do you judge the chance as being either less than, equal to, or more than ‘the chance of gastro-
intestinal bleeding for a person who takes low-dose aspirin each day’ added to ‘the chance of 
gastro-intestinal bleeding for a person who takes low-dose clopidogrel each day’? 
 
Less than 
Equal to 
More than 
 
